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Abstract: 
This article addresses the issue of whether large shareholders in Victorian public 
companies were active in the control of companies or were simply wealthy rentiers. 
Using ownership records for 890 firm-years, we examine the control rights, socio-
occupational background, and wealth of large shareholders. We find that many large 
shareholders had limited voting rights and neither they nor family members were 
directors. This implies that the majority of public companies in the second half of the 
nineteenth century cannot be characterized as family companies and that large 
shareholders are better viewed as wealthy gentlemen capitalists rather than entrepreneurs. 
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One of the big questions in the historical evolution of the public corporation is this: When 
did ownership separate from control? The received view among business historians until 
recently was that when incorporation laws were liberalized in the nineteenth century, the 
ownership of corporations was dominated by founding families, but as public 
corporations grew in scale in the twentieth century, ownership became more dispersed.
1
 
This view has recently been challenged and has subsequently generated substantial 
debate among scholars.
2
 In this article, we contribute to this debate by analyzing large 
shareholders in Victorian public companies formed after the liberalization of British 
incorporation law in 1856.
3
 In related work, we find that the broad structure of corporate 
ownership was surprisingly diffuse in the Victorian era.
4
 In this article, however, we 
examine in detail the largest shareholders in all of our sample firms to establish whether 
they played an active governance role in companies or were wealthy rentiers who simply 
provided finance to companies. 
The acts that liberalized incorporation legislation in the United Kingdom required 
companies to report a detailed list of shareholders and their ownership to the Registrar of 
Companies on an annual basis.
5
 After a comprehensive archival search, we found 
ownership records for 488 unique companies and 890 company years for the second half 
of the nineteenth century. We define large shareholders as the largest owner in the 
company plus all others who own more than 10 percent of the company’s voting or cash 
flow rights. In total, across the 890 company years, we have identified 1,158 unique large 
shareholders. In order to assess whether these large owners played a governance role or 
were simply wealthy rentiers, we use our ownership data to measure how much voting 
control large shareholders had. We then examine the socio-occupational background of 
these large shareholders and where they lived, to see if they had a background consistent 
with being a rentier rather than an active large owner. Finally, we attempt to establish the 
wealth of large shareholders using probate records. We do so for two reasons. First, if a 
large shareholder’s ownership in a company is a substantial proportion of their wealth, 
this would imply that they exercised more control over the company because a large 
proportion of family wealth was at stake. Second, if a shareholder was a rentier, we want 
to see if they were from the super-rich elite or from the moderately wealthy middle class. 
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A study of large shareholders in Victorian Britain is of interest for at least one 
additional reason. The rapid expansion of both the U.K. equity market and the investing 
public during the latter part of the nineteenth century may have been facilitated by the 
control exercised by large owners acting to assure smaller shareholders that managers 
would act in their (the shareholders’) interests.6 
Taking our evidence as a whole, our main finding is that large owners in general 
do not appear to have exercised much control over the companies in which they were 
large shareholders. Rather, our evidence suggests that large shareholders in many 
Victorian companies were merely wealthy investors. This finding—that the average large 
shareholder did not appear to exercise much control—is consistent with Colin Mayer’s 
view that by giving up control, large owners are credibly committing to other parties who 
contract with the firm, particularly other investors, that they will not abuse their power to 
expropriate other stakeholders.
7
 Notably, Eric Hilt and Aldo Musacchio argue that 
something similar occurred in the early development of the U.S. and Brazilian equity 
markets.
8
 
This article contributes to a strand of business history literature that has criticized 
the control of British companies in the Victorian and Edwardian eras. Following Alfred 
Chandler, the commonly accepted view is that British firms, when they were established 
in the nineteenth century, were family controlled and that this persisted into the twentieth 
century, with the result that they did not develop the managerial sophistication of their 
U.S. counterparts.
9
 This state of affairs may ultimately have played a role in the relative 
decline of the British economy in the twentieth century.
10
 However, our findings suggest 
that this view needs some revision because the degree to which large shareholders or 
families controlled the vast majority of companies in our sample is debatable. 
This article also builds on the growing literature on investors in the Victorian era. 
To date, this literature has focused on sociocultural references and public perception of 
investors; investors in banks, gas companies, and railways; and the relationship between 
gender and investment.
11
 We augment this literature by looking solely at large 
shareholders across a wide variety of industries in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.
12
 
4 
 
Finally, this article contributes to the debate regarding the role of the city’s capital 
markets in channeling capital to colonial or overseas companies to the detriment of 
indigenous British firms.
13
 Our study enables us to add several nuances to this debate 
because 155 of the 488 companies in our sample are overseas companies, enabling us to 
see the differences (if they exist) in control by, and identity of, large shareholders. 
 
Data on Large Shareholders 
 
The Companies Acts of 1856 and 1862 liberalized U.K. incorporation law by 
permitting entrepreneurs to incorporate with limited liability simply by registering with 
the Registrar of Companies.
14
 Companies registered under these acts were required 
annually to return a list of their ordinary and, where applicable, preference shareholders 
to the Registrar of Companies using a standardized return form known as Form E. These 
returns always contained the shareholder’s name and the number of shares owned, and, in 
the majority of cases, they also contained the shareholder’s address and occupation. The 
returns of companies that were dissolved before 1970 were placed within the Companies 
Registration Office files at the National Archives at Kew (BT31 series) and the National 
Archives of Scotland (BT2 series). 
We searched the catalogues of the BT2 and BT31 series for public companies that 
had issued common stock quoted either in the Course of the Exchange between 1825 and 
1870 or in the Investor’s Monthly Manual in 1870, 1885, and 1899.15 Our final sample 
consists of 890 firm-years, representing 488 unique companies.
16
 Of these companies, 
333 were domestic companies and 155 can be defined as overseas companies, since their 
operations were based outside of the British Isles. Information on the location of a 
company’s main operations was obtained from memoranda of association contained with 
the files in the BT31 and BT2 series, Burdett’s Official Intelligence, Stock Exchange 
Official Intelligence, and Stock Exchange Year-book. 
Because the ownership archives consist of companies that became defunct at 
some stage before 1970, none of our sample companies are still in existence today as 
separate entities. Using the Register of Defunct Companies, we were able to trace the 
ultimate fate of most of our sample companies. About 55 percent became defunct because 
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they reconstructed or merged with another firm, while approximately a further 28 percent 
of sample companies were liquidated. Most of the banks and insurance companies in our 
sample merged with the banks that dominate these sectors today. Notably, the Clydesdale 
Bank is in our sample and, although it merged with the Midland Bank in 1920, it has 
continued to operate under its original name. Other companies in our sample merged to 
form industrial giants. For example, one of our sample companies, the Runcorn Soap and 
Alkali Company, merged with a group of other chemical companies to form United 
Alkali Company, which later merged with three other companies in 1926 to form 
Imperial Chemical Industries. Notably, the brand names associated with several sample 
companies that merged with other companies still exist today (e.g., Bovril and 
Schweppes). 
In Table 1, we see that our sample contains a range of companies from different 
industries. Based on Richard Grossman’s data on the industrial composition of the British 
capital market in this era, the one industry that is underrepresented is mining.
17
 We found 
that the ownership records for mining companies were more likely to be missing or 
incomplete, possibly because of their short-lived and speculative nature. The commercial 
and industrial sector is the largest, which is unsurprising since this was a growth sector in 
the stock market between 1860 and 1900.
18
 This sector consisted mainly of 
manufacturing and processing companies (e.g., oil, petroleum, nitrate chemicals, 
fertilizer, soap and alkali, railway carriages and rolling stock, bicycles, paper mills, plate 
glass, dairies, wagons), but also contained some large retailers, publishers, and hotels. As 
can be seen in Table 1, our sample is spread across time, with just over half of our sample 
firm-years concentrated in the 1880s and 1890s. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
A question arises as to the representativeness of our sample and whether our 
sample composition is likely to bias our findings in one direction or another. As 
ownership data was not collected by the Registrar of Companies on statutory companies 
set up prior to 1862 (e.g., railways and other utilities), nor on banks and insurance 
companies (unless they registered under the 1862 Companies Act), our sample does not 
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contain the largest companies in the Victorian era. Indeed, none of our companies would 
have made it into the top one hundred largest public companies in the year for which we 
have their ownership records; only 8.8 percent of our companies were in the top two 
deciles of non-railway companies in terms of their size and 63.3 percent of our 
companies were in the bottom half of non-railway companies in terms of their size. Thus, 
the vast majority of our sample consists of small and medium-sized public companies, 
which immediately biases our findings as such companies were more likely to have had 
large owners who exercised a substantial degree of control over their firms. 
In terms of stock exchanges, we have information from the Investor’s Monthly 
Manual on where the majority of our company’s securities were traded. The percentages 
of sample companies traded on particular stock markets were as follows: Aberdeen (4.5), 
Birmingham (5.5), Bristol (2.4), Cardiff (0.8), Dublin (1.0), Dundee (4.6), Edinburgh 
(10.3), Glasgow (9.8), Leeds (3.5), Liverpool (8.0), London (33.8), Manchester (7.7), 
Newcastle (2.4) and Sheffield (5.5).
19
 Therefore, it is apparent that our sample does not 
have an exclusive focus on London and there is a wide geographic distribution in terms 
of where securities were traded.
20
 
As we are interested in the voting rights as well as cash flow rights of large 
owners, we collected data on each company’s voting scales for each year for which they 
are in our sample from their articles of association (contained within the files in the BT31 
and BT2 series), Burdett’s Official Intelligence (BOI), and Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence (SEOI). These data were then used to calculate each shareholder’s voting 
rights. We found the voting structures for 729 of the 890 firm-years of ownership returns. 
As we are also interested in whether large shareholders were directors and 
whether they lived in close proximity to the companies in which they were large 
shareholders, we collected the names of directors and company headquarters for the 
relevant years from a combination of articles of association, BOI, SEOI, and Stock 
Exchange Year-book. In total, we located director names and company headquarters for 
575 of the 890 firm-years in our sample. 
As stated above, we define a large shareholder as the largest shareholder in the 
company plus anyone who owned more than 10 percent of voting or cash flow rights. We 
chose 10 percent to define large shareholders following the usual convention in the extant 
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literature.
21
 If two or more individuals are joint owners of the largest stake or 10 percent 
of voting or cash flow rights, then we consider each of those individuals as large owners. 
After using our digitized ownership returns to identify large shareholders, we then went 
to the original photographs to transcribe their names, addresses, and occupations. In total, 
we have 1,158 large shareholders in our sample, with 111 of those being joint owners. Of 
the 111 joint owners, 29 share a common surname with their co-owners, implying a 
familial relationship. 
 
Control Exercised by Large Shareholders 
 
Companies in Victorian Britain raised capital by issuing ordinary and preference shares 
as well as debentures.
22
 The voting rights attached to preference shares were sometimes 
the same as for ordinary shares, but the usual practice was to assign preference 
shareholders voting rights under certain conditions, such as on reduction or increase of 
capital, on winding up of the company, or if the dividend on preference shares was in 
arrears. Debenture holders only exercised control whenever the company failed to make 
its coupon payments. 
Table 2 contains statistics on the percentage of capital and voting rights owned by 
the largest shareholder in each firm-year. These figures contain ordinary and, if the 
company issued them, preference shares. In addition, the voting rights take account of 
whether or not preference shares had unconditional voting rights attached to them. In 
terms of the statistics for the overall sample, we see that the median largest shareholder 
owned 6.8 percent of capital and 4.9 percent of voting rights. To give some perspective 
on these figures, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer 
suggest that a company has an ultimate owner (i.e., concentrated ownership) if the largest 
owner controls more than 20 percent of voting rights.
23
 They also have a weaker 
definition, where an ultimate owner is defined as having more than 10 percent of voting 
rights. Thus, no matter which definition of theirs we use, we can see that the median 
company in our sample did not have an ultimate owner. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
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As can be seen in Table 2, unlike in later eras, the voting rights of large 
shareholders in Victorian companies were generally lower than their cash flow rights. 
This was due to the popularity of voting scales, which penalized large investors and 
empowered smaller investors. For example, many companies had voting scales that 
placed an upper limit on the maximum number of votes that any one investor could have 
and/or a nonlinear voting scale skewed against large owners.
24
 
As can be seen in Panel A of Table 2, which contains statistics on the largest 
owners by industry, there are few industries in which the median largest owner has close 
to or over 10 percent of voting rights. In three major industries, the median largest owner 
had the highest capital and voting rights: breweries; spinning and weaving; and iron, coal, 
and steel. One of the key differences between these three industries and others in Table 2 
is that the former were established firms, with a partnership organizational form in place 
before they became public companies. In each of these industries, partnerships converted 
to limited companies in order to raise capital from the public to finance their growth in 
firm scale which occurred in all of these industries.
25
 The increased capital needs of 
breweries arose from (a) technological changes that increased their optimal size and (b) 
their need to secure public houses following regulatory changes in licensing, which 
pushed up their cost.
26
 In terms of iron, coal and steel, changes in technical processes and 
the increased scale of steel production led these firms to seek capital on public markets.
27
 
Similarly, the capital needs of the spinning and weaving sector arose from an increase in 
the scale of efficient production.
28
 
Panel A of Table 2 also reveals that low percentages of voting rights were held by 
the median largest owner in banks, finance, insurance, and gas, light, and waterworks. 
The latter were public utilities, which typically had large capital needs. Banks, finance, 
and insurance companies typically structured their articles of association to ensure diffuse 
ownership, by restricting the amount of shares any one investor could own and/or by 
skewing their voting scales in favor of small investors.
29
 One reason for doing so was that 
such companies usually had uncalled capital or extended liability, and depositors and 
policyholders with these companies may have preferred to see the company’s shares 
dispersed amongst many wealthy investors instead of sold to one large wealthy owner.
30
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Panel B of Table 2 reveals that there is very little difference, in terms of the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder, between British companies 
operating in the domestic market and those operating in foreign markets. Meanwhile, 
Panel C shows that as the mean and median percentage of capital owned by the largest 
shareholder fell during our sample period, the mean and median percentage of voting 
rights increased. The contrasting movements over time are simply the result of the 
increased usage of nonvoting preference shares, which enabled large shareholders to have 
a share of voting rights that exceeded their share of capital. 
Although the largest shareholders held relatively small amounts of the voting 
rights in their companies, they may have been able to exercise de facto control of the 
company through being directors. As can be seen in Table 3—which shows the 
proportion of large shareholders who were also directors—there are 803 large 
shareholders of companies for which we have details on who the directors were; only 306 
of these shareholders were directors. In other words, 61.8 percent of large shareholders in 
our sample period were not directly involved in their firm’s governance. Given their large 
stakes, one would expect more large shareholders to play a governance role. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that the company was a family company that had been 
established by the largest shareholder, who managed it on a day-to-day basis; that 
shareholder could have exercised control without being a director if they had superior 
knowledge of the business and their own men on the board. In order to determine whether 
a company was a family company, we examine whether the large shareholder’s surname 
was part of the company’s name. In Table 3, we see that in only 80 instances out of 1,158 
did the company’s name contain a large shareholder’s surname. Another way of assessing 
whether a company is a family firm is to ask whether other directors shared a surname 
with the large shareholders.
31
 As can be seen in Table 3, there were 113 cases 
(constituting 153 directors) where at least one director had the same surname as a large 
investor. However, in the 496 cases where the large shareholder was not a director, it was 
in only 54 instances that a director shared a surname with the large shareholder. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
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Table 3 reveals interesting differences between sectors. In particular, companies 
where directors share the same surname as the large shareholder, and those where the 
company name contains the family name, are mainly in two sectors: breweries and 
commercial and industrial. Notably, companies in these two sectors mainly came to 
market in the 1880s and 1890s, which explains the patterns we see in Panel C. 
Industries that were more likely to be located overseas had a lower propensity for 
large shareholders to be directors. Panel B verifies this, as it reveals that there are marked 
differences between domestic and foreign companies in terms of large shareholders being 
directors or having family members as directors. This may indicate that large 
shareholders in foreign-based companies were simply wealthy passive investors. 
If large shareholders were founding entrepreneurs or part of the founding family, 
we would expect them to remain as large shareholders for a lengthy period of time. We 
exploit the fact that our dataset contains some multiple-firm-year observations to see 
whether or not there is much in the way of turnover of large shareholders. With an 
average of slightly over ten years between ownership censuses, we find that in 60.4 
percent of cases there are changes in the identity of the large shareholder. Only in 11.3 
percent of these cases does the new large shareholder have the same surname as the 
previous incumbent, and in 24.3 percent of these cases does the previous large owner 
remain as a shareholder. This implies significant turnover of large shareholders within 
our period and a very small proportion of large shareholders being replaced by family 
members. 
Notably, the turnover of large shareholders was greater in foreign companies than 
in domestic companies (74.5 percent change in identity of large shareholder versus 55.5 
percent), which is further evidence that large investors in foreign companies were passive 
investors. The four industries with the lowest turnover are breweries (46.2 percent); 
commercial and industrial (54.3 percent); iron, coal and steel (52.5 percent); and spinning 
and weaving (50.0 percent). Each of these industries was more likely to be founder or 
family controlled, so the lower turnover rate is unsurprising. 
The overall picture that emerges from the analysis above is that the average large 
owner in the Victorian era had little in the way of control rights and did not play a 
governance role. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century the average 
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shareholder had more in the way of control rights, and it appears that more of a 
governance role was played by large shareholders or their family members. These 
findings raise several questions. First, who founded companies in this era? Second, why 
was there a change in the degree of separation between ownership and control towards 
the end of the century? Third, given the absence of control by large shareholders, who 
managed companies? 
Unlike most modern public companies, many companies that were floated in the 
Victorian era were floated from scratch. In other words, many stock market flotations 
were not conversions of previously established businesses, but new ventures that raised 
capital from the stock market at their inception.
32
 The founders, as such, were the 
promoters behind the business, but they did not necessarily invest heavily in the business 
or run the business once it was established. However, from the 1880s onwards, and 
particularly in the 1890s, business concerns were much less likely to launch from scratch 
and much more likely to be conversions of existing partnerships and private companies.
33
 
Whenever these companies were floated on the stock market, their founders typically 
tried to maintain control by issuing preference shares and debentures.
34
 This explains 
why there is less of separation of ownership from control towards the end of our sample 
period. 
In terms of who managed Victorian companies whenever large shareholders did 
not play a hands-on managerial role, general managers or managing directors under the 
oversight of a board of a directors did, which is contrary to Chandler’s critique of late-
nineteenth-century British capitalism. This, in turn, raises questions about how 
shareholders ensured that managers and directors ran the firm in their interests in an era 
when shareholder protection laws were weak. Gareth Campbell and John Turner suggest 
that capital market discipline, the expectation that nearly all earnings would be paid out 
as dividends, local stock exchanges, and boards of directors may all have played a role in 
ameliorating the agency problem in this era.
35
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The Socio-occupational Background of Large Shareholders 
 
Having established that a majority of large shareholders owned a small proportion 
of voting rights and did not play a governance role, in this section we examine who large 
shareholders were. We do so primarily because we want to ascertain whether large 
shareholders had a background consistent with being a rentier rather than an active large 
owner. 
Since the shareholder returns report socio-occupational status and the address of 
shareholders, we can get some idea of the backgrounds and geographical distribution of 
large investors.
36
 However, a caveat needs to be placed on using what was reported in the 
shareholder returns. A large number of males were recorded as “gentleman” or “esquire.” 
Men described as such could easily have been active businessmen, financiers, or 
professionals, or retired from active business or professional life.
37
 Alternatively, they 
could have been members of the landed gentry or simply signaling their social status. 
However, several pieces of evidence suggest that the majority of cases where someone is 
described as a gentleman or esquire are either men retired from active life or landed 
gentry. The first piece of evidence is that gentlemen are much less likely than men of 
other socio-occupational groups to be directors; specifically, 32 percent of gentlemen are 
directors, whereas comparable figures for other groupings range from 48 to 64 percent. 
The second piece of evidence is that 46 percent of gentlemen live outside large towns or a 
metropolitan area, which gives some indication about the extent to which they were 
members of the landed gentry.
38
 
Gentlemen are by far the largest socio-occupational category in Table 4. Most of 
these individuals are not large shareholders in family firms; only 4.0 percent share their 
name with the company’s name, and only 12.7 percent share their surname with a 
director. In addition, only 32.2 percent of gentlemen large shareholders are directors, 
which is a substantially lower percentage than that of the two other major occupation 
categories in Table 4—merchants (54.1 percent) and manufacturers (64.7 percent). All of 
this evidence would suggest that many gentlemen large shareholders were wealthy 
passive investors simply seeking a return on their investment. The high proportion of 
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gentlemen among large investors in foreign companies adds further support to this 
contention. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
In terms of other classical rentier groups, a small proportion of large shareholders 
were from the nobility (Table 4).
39
 However, the average value of their holdings in 
domestic companies is much larger than that of large shareholders from other socio-
occupational categories. The only instance of members of nobility being closely involved 
with the companies in which they were large shareholders is the case of the Wigan Coal 
and Iron Company, which was established by James Lindsay (Earl of Crawford and 
Balcarres) in 1865 to acquire collieries on the Wigan coalfield. When his son, Alexander 
Lindsay, succeeded to the earldoms in 1869, he devoted a lot of his time to the running of 
the company.
40
 
Recent scholarship has uncovered the extent to which women invested in the 
stock market in the nineteenth century.
41
 Interestingly, thirty-five large shareholders in 
our sample were women.
42
 One explanation for this may be that they held investments in 
family firms or invested jointly with a family member; however, only three women 
invested jointly with a family member, a further three were large shareholders in a firm 
where one director shared their surname, and only one was a large shareholder in a firm 
that contained her surname in its appellation. Thus, it appears that that vast majority of 
female large shareholders were wealthy investors, with no family interest in terms of the 
family that shared its surname with the company in which they invested. The other 
notable thing about women large investors is that they invested predominantly in 
domestic companies, which may reflect an aversion to risk or a local bias.
43
 
Professionals (mainly doctors, engineers, and surgeons) and members of the legal 
profession were large shareholders in a wide variety of industries. In many instances, our 
evidence points to the fact that these were wealthy professionals who had a large stake 
without necessarily having a family or managerial interest in the company. 
Financiers and bankers have come in for criticism, in that they failed British 
industry and entrepreneurs by not providing sufficient capital.
44
 However, sixty-eight of 
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the large shareholders in our sample were from the finance sector—i.e., bankers, 
stockbrokers, and other finance professionals (e.g., actuaries, accountants)—and, as can 
be seen in Table 4, financiers were predominately large shareholders in domestic 
companies. Of the forty-one bankers, nineteen were large shareholders in banks, which is 
unsurprising. The other twenty-two, who were large shareholders in a range of companies 
(including iron, coal, and steel; breweries; and commercial and industrial companies), 
include the names of several notable bankers and banking dynasties: Grenfell, Glyn, 
Gurney, Hambro, Lloyd, Schroder, Stern, and Tiarks. In other words, even though city 
banks may have been conservative or risk averse when it came to lending to British 
industry, individual bankers within the City were not and were willing to provide large 
amounts of capital to British companies. 
In Table 4, we see that on twenty-eight occasions, members of Parliament were 
large shareholders.
45
 Although these individuals are recorded as politicians in the 
shareholder returns, using the Dictionary of National Biography and other genealogical 
tools, we found occupations in twenty-two cases, with the most common occupations 
being manufacturer, banker, and barrister. At least nine were, or had formerly been, 
manufacturers, with the most notable being Joseph Chamberlain. Five were from 
banking, with Henry S. King, John Lubbock, and Alexander Matheson (of Jardine 
Matheson) being the most notable. William Quilter, who was a stockbroker and a 
founding director of the National Telephone Company, was a large shareholder in the 
Lion Fire Insurance Company.
46
 
Manufacturers differ from other categories in Table 4 in that they make up an 
extremely small proportion of large shareholders in foreign companies. One explanation 
is that manufacturers were much more likely to be large shareholders in family firms or 
in firms where they played a governance role. Notably, in 38 out of 124 instances, large 
shareholders who were manufacturers had their surname in the company name. 
Furthermore, manufacturers were much more likely to be directors than were any other 
category in Table 4—64.0 percent of large shareholders who were manufacturers were 
also directors. A further piece of evidence that suggests manufacturers were intimately 
involved with the companies in which they were large shareholders is that they rarely 
were large shareholders in nonmanufacturing firms; in fact, only nineteen of them were, 
15 
 
and most of those firms were financial companies.
47
 In some cases, a manufacturer may 
have had a large shareholding in a company because they had an interest in the industry. 
For example, Henry Bessemer, of Bessemer converter fame, was a large shareholder in 
Thames Plate Glass Company in 1865, which may have arisen from his innovations in 
the production of plate glass.
48
 
When compared with manufacturers, merchants were much more likely to invest 
in foreign companies and less likely to play a governance role within their companies. 
They were also much more likely to be large shareholders in nonmanufacturing 
companies, with ninety-five of them being so. Merchants were mainly classified as such 
in the shareholder returns, but we also assigned others, such as contractors, to this 
category. One notable example is Thomas Brassey, the well-known civil engineering 
contractor, who was a large shareholder in the Central Argentine Land Company in 
1870.
49
 
As can be seen in Table 4, forty-nine of our large owners are institutions. In nine 
of these cases, it is the company owning its own shares—particularly among banks and 
insurance companies, which sought to make markets in their own shares.
50
 Eleven of the 
institutional large owners are banks; however, this does not provide partial absolution 
from the charge that banks failed British industry, since they were all large shareholders 
in foreign companies. A further eleven of the institutional large shareholders were 
investment trusts. Notably, in ten of the eleven instances where an investment trust is a 
large shareholder, the shareholding is in a foreign company, and no investment trust was 
a large owner prior to 1891.
51
 In seventeen cases, another company is the large 
shareholder and that company usually operates in the same industry. 
The overall finding from our analysis of the socio-occupational backgrounds of 
large shareholders is that many large shareholders were rentiers or passive investors who 
were not involved in governance. Notably, manufacturers and merchants who were large 
shareholders appear to have played a more active role in firm governance than did other 
socio-occupational groups, and many of them appear to have been large shareholders in 
family firms. 
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The Geographic Spread of Large Shareholders 
 
Having established the socio-occupational background of large shareholders, we 
now move on to another question: where were large shareholders from? We perform this 
analysis for two reasons. First, we want to see if large London capitalists, who were more 
likely to be rentiers than other capitalists were, invested in foreign or domestic 
companies. Second, given that many large shareholders did not play a governance role, 
we want to see how close large shareholders lived to the companies in which they 
invested. 
Five geographic areas dominate: London (34.6 percent of large shareholders), 
Lancashire (12.2 percent), Yorkshire (7.0 percent), Scotland (13.6 percent), and overseas 
(5.1 percent). Notably, the first three areas were those that had provided the bulk of 
capital during the development of the railways in the 1840s.
52
 London provided the 
largest pool of large shareholders, but its share of large investors (34.6 percent) was 
somewhat below its share of companies headquartered there (45.6 percent). Lancashire 
provided the second largest pool of large shareholders, which mirrored the share of 
companies headquartered there. Notably, while London provided 51.6 percent of all large 
shareholders in foreign companies, Lancashire and Yorkshire provided only 5.9 percent. 
This suggests that it was London wealth rather than Lancashire or Yorkshire wealth that 
financed foreign companies.
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The importance of Scotland as a source of large shareholders arises purely 
because we have Scottish companies in our sample.
54
 Only 15 of the 157 large investors 
from Scotland were large shareholders in a non-Scottish company, and only 26 large 
shareholders in 162 Scottish-registered companies were from outside Scotland, with 10 of 
the 26 being from overseas and 16 from England. This suggests both that capital markets 
were geographically segmented in the Victorian era and that large shareholders lived 
close to the companies they invested in. Notably, nearly 12 percent of all large 
shareholders in foreign companies came from Scotland. This can largely be attributed to 
the large number of freestanding companies that were incorporated in Scotland.
55
 In a 
similar vein, many overseas companies registered in London, which may explain the high 
share of London addresses in the number of large shareholders in overseas companies. 
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Large investors from overseas constituted 5.1 percent of our sample of large 
shareholders but contributed 10.9 percent of the capital provided by large owners. These 
foreign large shareholders were usually investing in British-registered companies that had 
operations in the country where they were domiciled and not in companies with 
operations in the United Kingdom. In total, 16.1 percent of large shareholders in foreign 
companies were from overseas. 
Having established that the geographic spread of large investors largely mirrored 
the geographic spread of company headquarters, we now move on to this question: how 
close to their company’s headquarters did large shareholders live? In the Victorian era, a 
large shareholder’s ability to influence the firm or monitor its directors may have been 
largely determined by how close they lived to their company’s headquarters. Notably, 
even companies we describe as foreign had their headquarters in the United Kingdom. 
We have head office details for 771 large shareholders, and we find that 520 of them 
lived in the same county as the company in which they were the large shareholder. This 
proximity may have been partially driven by the provincial nature of the British capital 
market at the time. Such a capital market gave large investors access to information as 
well as possible influence over the company. 
 
The Wealth of Large Shareholders 
 
In this section, we examine the wealth of our sample of large shareholders. We do 
so for several reasons. First, it may tell us whether the companies they invested in were 
family companies to which they had committed large proportions of their wealth. Second, 
it will help us to understand whether large capitalists in this era were members of the 
superrich or from the moderately wealthy middle class. 
To estimate the wealth of a large shareholder, we use their terminal wealth as 
recorded in probate records. Several caveats must be borne in mind when using probate 
records as an estimate of a person’s wealth. The first thing to bear in mind is that probate 
records may underestimate a decedent’s true wealth.56 The second is that probate records 
may not be representative of a person’s wealth when they were a large shareholder—
someone could have made or lost a fortune between the time they were a large 
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shareholder and the time of their death. We therefore run a set of robustness checks on 
our probated wealth data by looking at the subsample of individuals who died within two 
and ten years of an ownership census in which they were identified as a large 
shareholder. 
We use Ancestry.com to trace the probated effects of large investors as reported 
in will calendars. Unfortunately, most Scottish wills were sealed, with the result that no 
effects are reported. In order to ensure that the probate records were actually those of 
large shareholders, we required that the address, occupation, and name (plus initials, if 
any) as recorded in probate records matched those recorded in the ownership returns. 
This rigorous methodology and the absence of effects in the Scottish probate records 
means that we have probated wealth for only one half of our large shareholders. 
Fifty-two of our large shareholders have probated wealth that was substantially 
below the paid-up value of their shareholding; all had low wealth and died a median of 
nineteen and a half years after the ownership census date in which they are recorded as 
large shareholders. These large shareholders obviously had lost a lot of money before 
they died.
57
 Since these 52 individuals overly influence the ratio of the value of a 
shareholding to probated wealth, we omit them from our analysis in Table 5. As a result, 
we have 529 large shareholders in our sample. For the sake of comparison, all probate 
values in Table 5 are converted into 1900 values using Jim O’Donoghue, Louise 
Goulding, and Grahame Allen’s composite price index.58 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
As can be seen in Table 5, the large shareholders in our sample of Victorian 
companies had a mean (median) wealth of £342,700 (£97,900). To provide some context, 
Peter Lindert estimates that in 1875, the average estate of merchants was £11,804, that of 
gentlemen and the nobility was £9,855, and that of professionals only £1,201.
59
 To put 
this into further perspective, W. D. Rubinstein, in his study of probate records, finds that 
there were only 158 millionaires and 383 half-millionaires in the United Kingdom in the 
period from 1880 to 1914.
60
 Tom Nicholas, in his study of the 790 British businessmen 
listed in the Dictionary of Business Biography, finds that the median probate of 
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prominent businessmen was £154,471 for those born between 1800 and 1840 and 
£134,275 for those born between 1840 and 1880.
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The bottom two rows of Table 5 reveal that the median wealth of those who died 
within ten and two years of being recorded as a shareholder in an ownership return is 
only slightly lower than that of the overall sample. This suggests that large shareholders 
were typically very wealthy when they were large owners and did not necessarily become 
wealthy as a result of being a large shareholder.  
Across the overall sample, we see in Table 5 that the mean and median ratio of 
the par value of a large investor’s shareholding to their probated wealth was 14.1 and 6.3 
percent, respectively. These figures increase slightly for those shareholders who died 
within ten and two years of being recorded as a large shareholder. In other words, the 
average large shareholder invested a considerable proportion of their income in the 
companies where they were a large owner. Taken with the findings above, the significant 
proportion of overall wealth invested in companies is surprising given the low probability 
that large shareholders were directors or exercised control. Notably, the correlation 
coefficient between the proportion of wealth invested in a company and being a director 
is low, being only 0.07. 
In terms of industry, the least wealthy large shareholders were in the spinning and 
weaving, steamship, and wagon industries (Table 5). However, large investors in these 
industries usually had more of their wealth tied up in the company than did those in other 
industries, which may indicate family ownership or heightened confidence in the 
company because it was a conversion and therefore had a track record. Notably, large 
shareholders in these industries were more likely to be directors than large shareholders 
in other industries were (Table 4). The lowest ratios of par value to probated wealth were 
in finance, insurance, and gas, light, and waterworks. These industries attracted wealthy 
investors and were much less likely than other industries to be family concerns. 
There is no statistical difference between the mean (and median) of the wealth of 
large owners who invested in foreign companies and that of those who invested in 
domestic companies. Thus, there is no evidence to indicate that the superwealthy were 
large shareholders in foreign companies, leaving the moderately wealthy to be large 
shareholders in domestic companies. 
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In terms of socio-occupational background, large shareholders who were women 
and those who were members of the legal profession had the lowest wealth, while 
politicians and members of the nobility were the wealthiest groups of large investors. 
Thus, the members of the governing elite who were large shareholders were also very 
wealthy individuals. Notably, manufacturers had the highest ratio of par value to probated 
wealth among all socio-occupational classes, which is consistent with the results above, 
suggesting a greater likelihood that manufacturing companies were family-controlled 
(Table 4). 
Table 6 contains details of the large shareholders in our sample who were 
millionaires in terms of 1900 prices. Five things are worth highlighting. First, apart from 
Christian Allhusen and George Muntz, these millionaires were not large shareholders in 
companies they had founded nor were part of the founding family, suggesting that the 
wealthiest large shareholders were merely investors. Notably, only nine of the twenty-
three millionaires were directors in the companies they had invested in. Second, in terms 
of socio-occupational background, twelve millionaires came from industry and 
manufacturing, nine from finance, one from the landed gentry, and one was a journalist. 
This supports Nicholas’s analysis of wealth holding, which suggests that even among the 
superwealthy there was a heterogeneous pattern of wealth holding, while there is little 
evidence to support Rubinstein’s hypothesis that wealth was concentrated in the hands of 
individuals active in finance and commercial pursuits.
62
 Third, sixteen of these twenty-
three millionaires were based in London, which lends some support to Rubinstein’s 
hypothesis that wealth in this era was concentrated in London rather than the provinces.
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Fourth, these millionaires did not commit a large proportion of their wealth to these 
companies, with Christian Allhusen and George Muntz having the highest percentage of 
their wealth tied up in their companies—but even these are relatively low percentages. 
Fifth, eleven of these twenty-three millionaires were large shareholders in overseas 
companies rather than British companies. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
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Conclusion 
 
Our findings suggest that the majority of large shareholders in Victorian Britain 
did not own large portions of the voting rights in the companies they invested in. 
Furthermore, the majority of large investors were not directors and neither were their 
family members. We also observe substantial churn among large shareholders. Taken 
together, these findings imply that the majority of public companies in the second half of 
the nineteenth century cannot be characterized as being family companies and that large 
shareholders are better viewed as wealthy capitalists rather than entrepreneurs. There are 
some exceptions to these findings: large shareholders in breweries, iron and steel 
companies, spinning and weaving companies, and manufacturing companies usually had 
substantial voting rights and were much more likely than those in other industries to be 
directors. There was also less churn of large shareholders in these sectors. In addition, it 
was much more likely that companies in these sectors were family firms. We also see that 
companies established during and after the 1890s were more likely to be family firms 
than those set up earlier, with large shareholders playing an important governance role. 
In terms of the identity of the capitalists who backed companies in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, we find that the majority of them can be categorized as 
gentlemen, merchants, or manufacturers. Thus, the main backers of Victorian public 
companies were primarily wealthy rentiers or businessmen. About one third of large 
shareholders came from London, but a considerable proportion came from the industrial 
heartland of Lancashire as well as Yorkshire. Large shareholders in overseas companies 
were more likely to be gentleman capitalists from London, while manufacturers and 
Lancashire-based individuals were typically large investors in domestic companies. 
Many of the large shareholders in our sample were among some of the wealthiest 
individuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, the superwealthy from 
across the nation played an important part in financing British public companies during 
this important phase in the development of the public corporation and capital market, and 
they did so without necessarily having much control over the companies in which they 
invested. Furthermore, we find no evidence of a financial dichotomy, in that those who 
had become very wealthy because of the industrial revolution and those who had become 
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very wealthy through commercial and financial business both contributed to this 
expansion of British business and the British capital market in the Victorian era. 
The main finding of this article revises the prevalent perception that British public 
companies in the Victorian era had large owners and were dominated by families. Up 
until recently, the standard view has been that ownership separated from control in the 
United Kingdom at some stage in the second half of the twentieth century. However, the 
reality appears to be more nuanced: it appears that in the history of the U.K. corporation 
over the past two centuries, ownership was initially separated from control; then, around 
the turn of the twentieth century, ownership began to become more concentrated; and 
then, at some stage after 1950, ownership began to separate from control once again. 
These changes in the nature of corporate ownership in the United Kingdom and their 
long-term impact on the capital market are something that business historians should 
investigate in future research. 
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 Table 1 
Industry Breakdown of Sample  
 
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
        
Banks 1 30 25 46 26 14 142 
Breweries 0 3 4 7 15 8 37 
Commercial and Industrial 4 54 32 62 64 33 249 
Docks 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 
Finance 2 11 7 6 3 1 30 
Gas and Light 4 9 4 9 9 6 41 
Insurance 1 8 10 14 12 5 50 
Iron, Coal and Steel 0 5 9 25 18 10 67 
Mines 2 11 5 11 11 8 48 
Mortgage and Land 0 3 3 34 23 15 78 
Spinning and Weaving 0 3 1 17 12 2 35 
Steamships 0 8 4 12 5 8 37 
Tea and Coffee 0 8 3 2 3 0 16 
Telegraph 1 1 5 7 3 2 19 
Tramways 0 0 2 9 9 4 24 
Wagon 0 2 1 4 5 2 14 
        
Foreign 4 45 28 72 68 42 259 
Domestic 11 111 87 195 150 77 631 
        
Total 15 156 115 267 218 119 890 
Source: See text. Companies Registration Office files at the National Archives at Kew (BT31 series) and 
the National Archives of Scotland (BT2 series). 
Note: The industry classification used above is that used by contemporary stock exchange manuals such as 
the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. 
 
  
Table 2 
Percentage of Capital / Votes Owned by Largest Shareholder  
  Capital    Votes  
 
Average Median Stdev  Average Median Stdev 
PANEL A: INDUSTRY        
Banks 5.4 4.0 4.4  3.7 2.0 4.4 
Breweries 17.0 13.7 12.2  16.4 10.6 18.1 
Commercial and Industrial 12.6 10.0 10.7  10.6 6.8 13.3 
Docks 12.4 12.4 1.3  11.3 12.2 2.6 
Finance 7.8 6.0 7.0 
. 
 4.5 3.4 3.8 
Gas Light and Waterworks 9.7 6.8 9 0  9.0 3.6 12.2 
Insurance 9.2 5.1 12.8  3.5 2.9 3.0 
Iron, Coal and Steel 14.4 10.0 12.9  12.5 9.0 10.8 
Mines 10.8 6.8 9.9  8.3 4.9 10.1 
Mortgage and Land 9.2 5.4 10.5  7.2 4.2 9.9 
Spinning and Weaving 7.3 4.9 5.9  8.4 8.9 6.6 
Steamships 11.2 6.5 14.4  11.2 5.7 15.7 
Tea and Coffee 10.7 9.4 6.6  6.2 4.4 5.2 
Telegraph 17.7 8.8 17.0  12.7 5.9 17.0 
Tramways 10.7 4.6 16.4  8.7 4.2 14.7 
Wagon 8.1 6.8 5.5  6.8 6.7 5.4 
        
PANEL B: LOCATION        
Domestic 10.1 6.9 9.7  8.2 4.9 10.6 
Foreign 11.5 6.4 13.2  9.7 5.0 13.5 
 
       
PANEL C: DECADE        
1850s 
 
5.8 5.9 3.0  3.4 3.2 2.4 
1860s 
 
11.7 7.3 10.6  7.4 4.6 9.4 
1870s 10.8 7.7 9.5  7.9 4.8 8.8 
1880s 10.8 7.0 12.1  8.4 4.7 11.4 
1890s 10.4 6.7 10.4  9.4 5.4 11.0 
1900s 8.9 5.6 10.0  10.0 5.2 16.4 
        
Overall 10.5 6.8 10.7  8.6 4.9 11.6 
Source: See text. See table 1. 
Notes: The industry classification used above is that used by contemporary stock exchange manuals such as 
the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence and Stock Exchange Yearbook.  We follow the categorisation of 
these yearbooks and work backwards so that although breweries may have originally been in the industrial 
and commercial category in the yearbooks, they are always in a separate category in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Large Shareholders and Control  
 
Large Shareholders 
Who Were Directors 
Large Shareholders 
Who Had Same 
Surname as Other 
Directors 
Large Shareholder 
Surname Is Part of 
Company’s Name 
 No. % No. % No. % 
PANEL A: INDUSTRY       
Banks 50 45.9 18 16.5 4 2.8 
Breweries 26 42.6 11 18.0 11 29.7 
Commercial and Industrial 92 39.0 52 22.0 50 20.1 
Docks 2 66.7 1 33.4 0 0.0 
Finance 5 29.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Gas Light and Waterworks 11 35.5 2 6.5 0 0.0 
Insurance 11 34.4 1 3.1 0 0.0 
Iron, Coal and Steel 29 50.0 7 12.1 9 13.4 
Mines 16 32.7 3 6.1 0 0.0 
Mortgage and Land 20 23.5 6 7.1 0 0.0 
Spinning and Weaving 9 75.0 3 25.0 5 14.3 
Steamships 18 52.9 7 20.6 0 0.0 
Tea and Coffee 1 11.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Telegraph 1 5.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Tramways 8 23.5 2 5.9 0 0.0 
Wagon 7 46.7 0 0.0 1 7.1 
       
PANEL B: LOCATION       
Domestic 246 44.2 99 17.8 77 9.2 
Foreign 60 24.3 14 5.7 3 0.9 
 
      
PANEL C: DECADE       
1850s 
 
2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1860s 
 
36 45.6 6 7.6 13 8.3 
1870s 13 40.6 1 3.1 6 5.2 
1880s 119 41.2 44 15.2 30 11.2 
1890s 88 36.7 36 15.0 29 13.3 
1900s 48 29.8 26 16.1 2 1.7 
       
Overall 306 38.1 113 14.1 80 9.0 
Source: See text. See table 1 for ownership sources. Directors were obtained from Burdett’s Official 
Intelligence, Stock Exchange Official Intelligence and  Stock Exchange Year-book. 
 
 
Notes: The industry classification used above is that used by contemporary stock exchange manuals such as 
the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. 
  
Table 4 
Large Shareholders’ Socio-occupational Status 
 All 
Companies 
Average 
Value of 
Holding 
(£000s) 
Domestic 
Companies 
Average 
Value of 
Holding 
(£000s) 
Foreign 
Companies 
Average 
Value of 
Holding 
(£000s) 
Gentlemen 327 15.6 220 12.4 107 23.3 
Merchant 252 14.6 176 13.3 76 17.6 
Manufacturer 124 23.9 118 23.6 6 29.3 
Unclassified males 124 23.5 80 23.1 44 24.4 
Institution 49 52.6 23 47.0 26 57.6 
Professionals 43 8.6 35 7.7 8 13.7 
Banker 41 14.2 31 8.7 10 27.0 
Legal Profession 41 9.6 31 10.0 10 8.4 
Women 35 13.5 33 9.9 2 34.5 
Politician 28 10.1 15 11.6 13 8.5 
Nobility 20 132.7 14 199.8 6 9.8 
Army and naval officers 16 14.8 12 10.5 4 25.8 
Stockbroker 14 10.9 9 12.6 5 5.7 
Other Finance 13 5.8 12 5.9 1 5.0 
Retailer 12 16.2 12 16.2 0 0.0 
White collar 9 9.8 8 10.8 1 10.0 
Clergy 5 7.3 3 7.4 2 14.3 
Agriculture 3 3.1 2 1.3 1 6.8 
Trustees 2 11.3 1 10.0 1 1.3 
       
 1,158 19.5 835 18.3 323 22.7 
Source: see text. . see table 1. 
Notes: Average value of holding is based on the par value of shares. 
  
Table 5 
Wealth of Large Shareholders 
 Probated Wealth of Large 
shareholders 
 
(1900 £’000s) 
Par Value of Shareholding / 
Probated Wealth 
 
 
(%) 
 Mean Median N Mean Median 
PANEL A: INDUSTRY      
Banks 231.0 104.1 93 12.9 7.8 
Breweries 234.8 77.4 38 16.1 10.1 
Commercial and Industrial 283.8 102.4 144 13.8 5.2 
Finance 386.6 295.8 13 13.8 2.1 
Gas Light and Waterworks 308.5 149.8 25 6.0 3.0 
Insurance 227.7 99.3 24 7.8 2.6 
Iron, Coal and Steel 202.9 136.6 49 16.7 8.7 
Mines 231.4 88.6 33 16.2 6.5 
Mortgage and Land 443.9 128.8 24 11.3 2.6 
Spinning and Weaving 82.6 35.0 23 17.1 11.7 
Steamships 150.4 41.9 15 37.0 26.1 
Tea and Coffee 136.7 140.0 6 15.0 2.3 
Tramways 133.0 73.1 19 14.4 6.3 
Wagon 120.2 57.6 13 14.1 13.4 
PANEL B: LOCATION      
Domestic 210.5 90.5 422 14.2 6.8 
Foreign 380.5 129.8 107 14.5 3.7 
PANEL C: OCCUPATION      
Gentlemen 523.8 96.8 171 15.0 7.0 
Merchant 262.9 109.0 101 14.6 5.7 
Manufacturer 282.3 117.4 78 15.9 9.8 
Professionals 166.4 152.1 19 14.7 3.2 
Banker 521.5 120.3 20 7.1 3.5 
Legal Profession 106.0 51.9 20 11.0 9.3 
Women 154.6 41.9 19 15.0 4.9 
Politician 423.4 338.9 21 6.7 2.2 
Nobility 581.8 118.7 15 7.8 0.4 
Army and naval officers 107.9 96.9 10 11.2 4.7 
      
Overall sample 342.7 97.9 529 14.1 6.3 
Shareholders who died within 10 
years of being a large owner 
379.9 92.6 210 14.1 7.8 
Shareholders who died within 2 
years of being a large owner 
222.5 84.7 68 15.2 10.0 
Sources: see table 1 for ownership sources. Probated wealth data are from the Will Calendars in 
Ancestry.com. 
Note: This table excludes 52 shareholders whose probated wealth was less than the paid-up value of their shareholding. 
O’Donoghue et al., “Composite Price Index” is used to convert probate values into 1900 values. The industry and 
occupations panels do not add up to 529 as not all industries or occupations are included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Large Owners Who Were Millionaires (1900 prices) 
Name [Year of 
death] 
Occupation 
(Occupation 
as given in 
ODNB or 
elsewhere) 
Residence Wealth 
£m 
(1900 
prices) 
Par value of 
shareholding 
/ wealth (%) 
Companies 
Charles Morrison 
[1909] 
Gentleman 
(Merchant 
banker) 
London 10.6 1.1 Amazon Telegraph; 
Emerald and Phoenix 
Brewery; Tramways 
Union; United Asbestos 
Co. 
James Williamson 
(Lord Ashton) 
[1930] 
Linoleum 
manufacturer 
Lancashire 5.0 0.2 San Sebastian Nitrate 
Thomas Brassey 
[1871] 
Contractor London 3.0 0.3 Central Argentine Land 
Co. 
Joseph T. Mills 
[1924] 
Landed gentry Norfolk 2.0 0.2 Cagliari Gas and Water 
Baron John H. 
Schroder [1910] 
Banker London 2.0 0.8 Amelia Nitrate 
Thomas V. Smith 
[1906] 
Distiller London 1.9 0.0 Smith Garrett and Co. 
(Brewery) 
George Grenfell 
Glyn  
(Lord Wolverton) 
[1889] 
Banker London 1.9 0.3 Palmer's Shipbuilding and 
Iron 
Michael T. Bass 
[1884] 
Brewer Staffordshire 1.9 0.8 National Discount 
Company 
George Wythes 
[1883] 
Contractor London / Kent 1.5 13.4 Bank of Queensland; 
Central Argentine Land 
Co; New British Iron; 
Rhymney Iron 
Ludwig Loeffler 
[1906] 
Gentleman 
(Inventor and 
businessman) 
London 1.5 2.4 Copiapo (Mining) 
Sydney Stern (Lord 
Wandsworth)  
[1912] 
Banker London 1.4 3.2 Indianapolis (Brewery) 
Thomas H. Ismay 
[1899] 
Ship Owner Lancashire 1.4 0.1 Platte Land 
George Herring 
[1906] 
Gentleman 
(Businessman) 
London 1.4 0.8 London & Yorkshire Bank 
James C. Eno 
[1915] 
Gentleman 
(Chemist) 
London 1.3 0.6 Tyne Steam Shipping 
Henry Tate [1909] Sugar 
merchant 
London 1.3 0.5 Hotchkiss Ordinance 
Samuel Fielden 
[1889] 
Gentleman 
(Cotton 
manufacturer) 
Lancashire 1.3 0.4 Union Plate Glass 
Christian Allhusen 
[1890] 
Gentleman 
(Chemical 
manufacturer) 
Buckinghamsh
ire 
1.2 8.6 Newcastle Chemical 
Works 
William C. Quilter 
[1911] 
Stock broker / 
M.P. 
London 1.2 2.1 Lion Fire (Insurance); 
United Telephone 
Davison Dalziel 
[1928] 
Gentleman 
(Newspaper 
proprietor and 
financier) 
London 1.2 1.2 Aux Classes Laborieuses 
Henry Silver 
[1910] 
Gentleman 
(Journalist) 
London 1.1 0.9 Bank of South Australia 
Everard A. Hambro 
[1925] 
Merchant 
banker 
London 1.1 2.9 Santa Fe Land 
F. W. Isaacson 
[1898] 
M.P. 
(Silk and coal 
merchant) 
London 1.1 0.3 Edinburgh United 
(Brewery) 
James Stern [1901] Banker  London 1.1 1.3 Imperial Bank 
George F. Muntz 
[1898] 
Metal 
manufacturer 
Worcestershir
e 
1.0 3.4 Birmingham Joint Stock 
Bank; Muntz's Metal Co.  
 
see table 5. 
Note: In the case where someone is a large owner in two or more companies, the value reported in the fifth column is 
the sum of the par value of shareholding/wealth ratios. ODNB is the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.  
Isaacson’s occupation outside of Parliament was obtained from Alex Windscheffel, Popular Conservatism in Imperial 
London, 1868–1906 (London, 2007), 112. 
 
 
